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Vincent Ferrara
INTRODUCTION
It is January 2018 the beautiful islands of Hawaii are seeing a usual influx in vacationers
looking to enjoy the desirable climate and favorable activities. Early one Saturday morning as
most residents and visitors were waking up to go on a tour or planning their day, an emergency
alert blasted on everyone’s phones, “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII.
SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL.”1 People panicked, reading in
disbelief, calling loved ones, having a full twelve minutes to seek shelter once the alert was sent.
A nuclear missile was evidently minutes away launched from a small authoritarian state who had
attained nuclear weapons.
This was not the synopsis of a sci-fi movie or some fictious novel seeking to craft a
clever new story on what a nuclear attack might look like. This was a real event, a false alarm
thankfully, but it caused fear of a nuclear attack unlike anything since the Cold War. Such an
event underscores an unnerving reality, despite previously unthinkable advances in technology,
our world remains in the antiquated state of being vulnerable to large scale nuclear destruction.
As the Cold War faded from many Americans recent memory, so too in our collective
consciousness has the threat of nuclear war. Bomb shelters and air raid drills once commonplace
have been relegated to updated history books. Events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the
threatening rhetoric of the early 1980s seem distant, as relevant today as the U.S.S.R. However,
recent events like the false alarm in Hawaii provide an unwelcomed reminder that nuclear threats
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Johanna Barr, Adam Nagourney, and David Sanger, Hawaii Panics After Alert About Incoming Missile Is Sent in
Error, N. Y. TIMES, (January 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/hawaii-missile.html.
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remain a part of everyday life no less, if not more likely, than it is portrayed in those new edition
history books.2
President Biden campaigned on and often asserts that “America is back.”3 This phrase
signaled a return to experienced, level-headed, responsible foreign policy. The administration has
sought re-engagement with our allies on issues such as climate change, refugees, and
international institutions such as the W.H.O., N.A.T.O., and the U.N., but there remains one area
in which this cooperation is sorely needed in: arms control dialogue and nuclear proliferation.
This paper aims to reinvigorate discussion on the most consequential foreign policy issue
every American President has faced since 1945, how to navigate the raised stakes of nuclear
international relations. The Biden administration, like several previous administrations in the
past two decades, faces the serious nuclear threat posed by Russia, a rogue North Korea, an
uncertain nuclear future in Iran, and the potential for increased nuclear proliferation. Besides the
daunting challenges mentioned, this administration must confront a new challenge, a rapid
nuclear buildup from China.
The Biden Administration has signaled a myriad of changes to American foreign policy,
but one thing that has not changed despite the White House’s new resident: bi-partisan consensus
that China presents the greatest existential threat to the United States.4 While rhetoric alleging a
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Ben Forsgren, Death Star Drones: How Missile Defense Drone Technology Marks the Advent of Contingent
Sovereignty, 46 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY L. Rev. 847 (2021). (Noting “The impact of the first atomic weapons
was devastating, leveling two cities in Japan and causing generational suffering from the effects of radiation. The
first bomb dropped on August 6, 1945, over the city of Hiroshima, killed between 90,000-146,000 people. The
other, dropped three days later on Nagasaki killed between 39,000-80,000 people. As awful as these statistics are,
demonstrating a tremendous human cost, nuclear weapons today are 3,000 times more powerful than the bombs
dropped in 1945”).
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Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World, THE WHITE HOUSE, (February 4, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americasplace-in-the-world/.
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Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, (April 9, 2021), 6-8, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021Unclassified-Report.pdf; Yasmeen Serhan, Consensus Isn’t Always a Good Thing, THE ATLANTIC, (October 5,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/10/perils-washingtons-china-consensus/620294/.
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new “Cold War” between Beijing and Washington is misguided5, it is undisputed that China’s
multifaceted strategic competition in economic, military, and global influence has as its goal to
become a preeminent world leader. Recent developments showing China’s massive buildup of
nuclear silos, shifting its six-decade old policy of minimum deterrence to potentially developing
a first strike capability, and conducting a hypersonic missile test in July, leading the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to declare a near “Sputnik moment,” all should reaffirm that consensus.6
Reliance on the failed theory that by asking nations nicely to reverse course in amassing
immense arsenals, hoping countries will finally realize their error is wishful thinking; it also
ignores the realpolitik mindset embedded in authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, the
tremendous cost incurred, not to mention the dangerous potential of a major nuclear war. This
approach has failed to achieve reductions or limit proliferation and should be relegated to a
footnote in those history books mentioned earlier.
The administration needs a bargaining chip, some tangible incentive to precipitate
meaningful nuclear arms control with China, as well as curbing proliferation. Where can such a
powerful negotiating tool be found? The President and his advisers need not look far to find it,
the answer originated in 1983, SDI. Now with technological advances, viable space-based
missile defense, once derided as “star wars” is more attainable than ever, adapting a 1980s idea
into a 21st century reality.
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Thomas Christensen, There Will Not Be a New Cold War: The Limits of U.S.-Chinese Competition, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, (March 24, 2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-24/there-will-not-benew-cold-war. (Noting three “essential and interrelated elements of the Cold War with Russia are lacking: (1) The
U.S. and China are not involved in a global ideological struggle for third party nations; (2) the globalization of the
world precludes dividing the world into economic blocs; and (3) the U.S. and China are not leading or supporting
alliances or proxy wars as was the case in Korea, Vietnam).
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William Broad and David Sanger, As China Speeds Up Nuclear Arms Race, the U.S. Wants to Talk, N. Y. TIMES,
(November 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/28/us/politics/china-nuclear-arms-race.html.
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This paper argues that the Biden administration should pursue a more rigorous missile
defense system in its endeavor to engage in strategic competition with China and regain
America’s leadership role in curbing nuclear proliferation. While the principal concern is
China’s nuclear buildup, this paper acknowledges an obvious fact, pursuing an enhanced spacebased missile defense also has collateral benefits to countering threats from North Korea and
Iran, but does not address this subtopic in detail.
In order to achieve a highly effective missile defense system and be in a position to
negotiate from a position of strength, the Biden administration needs to convince Congress to
increase and expand funding for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). This, like any
congressional persuasion, will not be easy, however, there is a significant possibility for
bipartisan success.
While this paper proposes increased funding for space-based missile defense technology,
it does not proffer an immediate short-term solution to a problem with such inherit complexity or
declare an end to nuclear weapons. Rather the issue of lowering the number of nuclear weapons
through difficult diplomacy and the proposed solution of viable space-based missile defense will
be long term investments. Achieving an effective missile defense system is a necessary rather
than a sufficient condition to altering the nuclear status quo. It has the potential to shift current
unwillingness to engage in arms control due to the false security of offensive arsenals, to a
serious dialogue incentivizing negotiation rather than nuclearization.
For all the complexities that accompanied arms control during the Cold War between the
former U.S.S.R. and the U.S., it seems minimal when compared to the multipolar reality of the
nuclear world today. The stakes are high, inaction not feasible, failure not an option.
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Part I assesses the current nuclear proliferation situation, the new administration’s
statements and actions on nuclear proliferation, China’s nuclear buildup, as well as
comprehensive analysis on the cost effectiveness of missile defense. Part II provides a historic
overview of the U.S.’s efforts at developing missile defense, and the origins of SDI. Part III
examines the U.S.’s current missile defense capabilities, the increased feasibility of space-based
missile defense, provides two historic examples to show why space defenses should not be
traded away and rejects common missile defense myths. Part IV discusses how the
administration can persuade Congress to fund space-based defense and outlines negotiations with
Beijing, using missile defense as leverage to incentivize agreement. It concludes by suggesting
some additional concrete steps to further increase our missile defense capabilities.
Part I: An administration and a New Nuclear Challenge
A. Current State of nuclear weapons and Proliferation
Nine states possess a staggering 13,080 nuclear weapons, 3,825 are deployed with
operational forces, and approximately 2,000 are kept in a state of high alert.7 Adding to the sense
of urgency, global reductions of operational warheads have stalled and may even be on the rise.8
The United States and Russia, undoubtedly the two nations with the largest nuclear arsenals are
both engaged in extensive, expensive modernization programs.9 Additionally, a dangerous trend
of consequential Cold War era nuclear reduction treaties such as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty have recently been discarded.10

7

SIPRI Yearbook 2021 Chapter 10 World Nuclear Forces: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, (June 2021), 16-17.
https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/sipri_yb21_summary_en_v2_0.pdf.
8
Id. While the total number of nuclear warheads is declining, it can be attributed to the U.S. and Russia dismantling
retired warheads.
9
The President’s Inbox, Why It Matters Nuclear Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (September 16, 2021),
https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/podcast-takeover-nuclear-security-presidents-inbox.
10
Lori Esposito-Murray, What the INF Treaty’s Collapse Means for Nuclear Proliferation, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, (August 1, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-inf-treatys-collapse-means-nuclear-proliferation.
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Besides the two major nuclear powers, other nuclear nations are seeking to expand, and
non-nuclear nations are pursuing nuclear capability, threatening further proliferation. Countries
such as India and Pakistan are also increasing their arsenals at a time when heated rhetoric and
the potential for conflict between the two remains high.11 Additionally, Iran has again moved
closer to developing nuclear capabilities as the JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal) was withdrawn from
by the U.S. and North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains central to their strategy of legitimacy.12
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia seeks nuclear weapons13, and the potential for terrorists to attain
nuclear weapons remains a legitimate concern, with the instability of the Middle East.14
As if this nuclear possession picture of the world is not enough, China is significantly
enlarging its nuclear arsenal, with recent reporting disclosing the building of at least 250 new
long range missile silos in three isolated locations, more than ten times the number of ICBM
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Joshua T. White, The Other Nuclear Threat: America Can’t Escape Its Role in the Conflict Between India and
Pakistan, THE ATLANTIC, (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/americas-roleindiapakistan-nuclear-flashpoint/584113/.
12
See generally, Eric Brewer, Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Program and Implications for U.S. Policy, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, (October 2021), 1-10, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/211015_Brewer_IranNuclear_USPolicy.pdf?x71oEFdt_zke9xyP7qN5Nc31Rw50FVCd. See also
W.J. Hennigan, ‘They’re Very Close’ U.S. General Says Iran Is Nearly Able to Build a Nuclear Weapon, TIME,
(November 24, 2021), https://time.com/6123380/iran-near-nuclear-weapon-capability/; Ken Dilanian, Carol Lee,
Dan De Luce, North Korea has more nuclear weapons than ever. What should Biden do?, NBC News, (April 17,
2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/north-korea-has-more-nuclear-weapons-ever-whatshould-biden-n1263983; See also, Lukasz Kulesa, Reinventing Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation as
Cooperative Efforts, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (April 21, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/report/reinventingnuclear-disarmament-and-nonproliferation-cooperative-endeavors.
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Kingston Reif, Saudi Arabia Threatens to Seek Nuclear Weapons, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, (June 2018),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-06/news/saudi-arabia-threatens-seek-nuclear-weapons. See also Michael
Gordon, Felicia Schwartz, and Warren Strobel, Saudi Arabia, With China’s Help, Expands Its Nuclear Program,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, (August 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-with-chinas-help-expands-itsnuclear-program-11596575671.
14
See generally, Bruce Riedel and Gary Samore, Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, The Brookings
Institute, (June 12, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/12_nuclear_proliferation_riedel.pdf.

6

silos it currently operates.15 The Chinese also lack transparency in reporting the number and
capabilities of their arsenal.16
The Biden administration in creating its approach to foreign policy, has through
messaging and action addressed the increasing nuclear threat posed by the PRC.
B. A New Administration with an Opportunity to Rethink U.S. Nuclear Policy
Despite China’s continued nuclear buildup, the administration has been consistent in its
message of endeavoring to work diplomatically with Beijing.17 Various officials from the State
Department to the President, in his first U.N. General Assembly speech, articulated a vision for
American leadership regarding nuclear disarmament, one which comports with pursuing missile
defense.18 This foundation is critical as policymakers are well underway in reviewing American
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Matt Korda and Hans Kristenen, China is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field, FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, (July 26, 2021), https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclearmissile-silo-field/.
16
SIRPI Yearbook, supra note 7.
17
See Denise Jenkins, Remarks to the 17th Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and
Nonproliferation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (September 6, 2021), https://www.state.gov/under-secretarybonnie-jenkins-remarks-nuclear-arms-control-a-new-era/. (The Under Secretary of State stated, “[B]oth
Russia and China are engaged in extensive, destabilizing nuclear buildup that poses new threats to collective
security and endangers the international rules-based order.” She then asked the central question, “how can we reduce
nuclear tensions and diminish the danger of a nuclear miscalculation or conflict?”)
18
See Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, THE WHITE
HOUSE, (September 21, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/21/remarksby-president-biden-before-the-76th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/. (After noting the focus of the
administration on the Indo-Pacific region, the President stated, “U.S. military power must be our tool of last resort”
later discussing “an era of new technologies. . .that have the potential to. . .reshape every aspect of the human
existence.” He cautioned that the “major powers have a duty to carefully manage their relationships, so they do not
tip from responsible competition to conflict.” He also declared the U.S. seeks no new Cold War and expressed a
willingness to engage with nations even if intense disagreement in other areas is present, using softer rhetoric
towards China. A central tenet of the Biden presidency, that democracies can meet the challenges of today
effectively, if not better than authoritarian regimes, was reiterated by stating, “democracy remains the best tool we
have to unleash our full human potential.” He left no doubt that we’ll all suffer the consequences of our failure if we
do not come together to address. . .enduring threats like nuclear proliferation.” (The speech underscored several
principles for pursuing missile defense, reaffirming reluctant to use offensive military strength and utilizing new
technologies to reshape nuclear norms).
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nuclear strategy through the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)19 and a Missile Defense Review
(MDR), both set to be completed by early 2022.20
The Biden administration issued its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” in
March 2021, stating, “As we re-engage the international system, we will address the existential
threat posed by nuclear weapons.”21 The guidance further added, “We will head off costly arms
races and re-establish our credibility as a leader in arms control…where possible, we will also
pursue new arms control arrangements…and we will engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia
and China on a range of emerging military technological developments that implicate strategic
stability.”22 The administration acknowledged that, “renewed American nonproliferation
leadership will also be essential to reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons” promising to
address the nuclear threats posed by Iran and North Korea.23
The administration also took a crucial step in furthering the dialogue on arms control and
reinstating America’s leadership role through concrete action, disclosing our nuclear arsenal
which stands at 3,750 warheads.24 The October 5, 2021, announcement provided much needed
transparency to the rest of the world and strengthens our position in pressuring other nations,

19
Kingston Reif, Biden Administration Begins Nuclear Posture Review, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, (September
2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/news/biden-administration-begins-nuclear-posture-review.
20
Missile Defense Review Will Address Growing Threats From Iran, North Korea, and Others, DOD NEWS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, (June 11, 2021), https://www.defense.gov/News/NewsStories/Article/Article/2654964/missile-defense-review-will-address-growing-threats-from-iran-north-korea-others/.
See also Kingston Reif, Missile Defense Review Begins, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, (October 2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-10/news/missile-defense-review-begins.
21
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, THE WHITE HOUSE, (March 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (October 5, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/transparency-in-the-u-s-nuclear-weapons-stockpile/.
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particularly China to be transparent in disclosing their arsenal.25 The declassified information
revealed that the U.S. has only 72 less weapons in its nuclear stockpile than reported in 2017.26
The NPR comes at a pivotal moment when the U.S. is considering costly modernization
investments in its offensive nuclear arsenal.27 The last NPR conducted under the Trump
administration in 2017-2018 sought to expand the capability of our nuclear arsenal.28 The NPR
will determine whether President Biden will transfer his rhetoric as a candidate, stating in 2019
the U.S. “does not need new nuclear weapons” and that he would work to reduce reliance and
excessive expenditures on nuclear weapons, into U.S. policy.29 His first budget request indicated
otherwise, continuing the modernization effort from the Trump administration.30
Notwithstanding the continuation, the NPR will give guidance on whether the administration will
seek to limit modernization efforts.31 Some actions the NPR could implement that there is
consensus on, would align with the administration’s position, shift towards an increased missile
defense and signal a non-aggressive position to Beijing would be: (1) declaring a sole purpose
policy that prohibits use of nuclear weapons in a preemptive or nonnuclear attack; (2) reducing
costly new modernization efforts to the extent possible, including lowering the number of
deployed ICBMs below the current number of 400, as well as extend current nuclear capabilities

25

See Bonnie Jenkins, Remarks to the 2021 NATO Nuclear Policy Symposium, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
(November 3, 2021), https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-the-2021-nato-nuclear-policy-symposium/. (Undersecretary
of State Bonnie Jenkins did exactly that. After referencing the release of U.S. weapons data, she stated, “In contrast,
Beijing is substantially expanding its nuclear arsenal, keeps its programs shrouded in secrecy, and is unwilling to provide
details on its plans to the international community. . .we call on Russia and the PRC to also commit to transparency and
provide the same data on their stockpiles as we have released”).
26
Id.
27
See infra p. 16.
28
See Reif, supra note 19.
29
Id.
30
Id. See also Daryl Kimball, Biden’s NPR Must Reduce the Role of Nuclear Weapons, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION. (October 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-10/focus/bidens-npr-must-reduce-rolenuclear-weapons.
31
Rebecca Hersman and Joseph Rodgers, Nuclear Modernization under Competing Pressures, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, (February 12, 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-modernizationunder-competing-pressures.
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rather than fund a costly new ICBM; and (3) Revise the number of nuclear weapons deemed
sufficient to deter a nuclear attack to 1,000, one third lower than the New Start Treaty, which
importantly in the realm of diplomacy, will provide a basis for reductions negotiations with
Russia and put the U.S. in a position to press Beijing on its arsenal.32 The NPR must coordinate
with the MDR, another review that will decide the trajectory of missile defense goals for the next
decade.
The Missile Defense Review will also clarify where the President and his new
administration stand on missile defense. As with the NPR, Biden continued with plans from the
previous administration to build the new Next Generation interceptor (NGI) to counter long
range ballistic missile attacks.33 The central question of the anticipated MDR is whether the
administration will endorse modifying existing systems which are designed to counter limited
strikes from North Korea and Iran, or to expand against longer range threats from more
numerous and sophisticated Russian and Chinese arsenals.34 While this paper advocates for
expanding research to counter larger threats due to advances in technology, at a minimum the
administration should continue the modernization of missile defense approved under President
Obama and marginally adjusted under President Trump and supported by a large bipartisan
margin in Congress.35 Remaining questions such as the future efforts to counter hypersonic
threats will provide further insight into missile defense for the next decade.36 Both reviews give
the Biden administration a chance to redefine nuclear weapons and missile defense, hopefully a

32

Steven Pifer, Go bold or go home: The Nuclear Posture review must give Biden real options, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE, (October 7, 2021) https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/go-bold-or-go-home-the-nuclear-posture-reviewmust-give-biden-real-options/ See also Kimball, supra note 30.
33
Reif. supra note 19.
34
Id.
35
See Walter Slocombe and Robert Soofer, A Bipartisan Call To Stay The Course On US Homeland Missile
Defense, BREAKINGDEFENSE, (September 10, 2021), https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/staying-the-course-on-ushomeland-missile-defense/.
36
Id.

10

chance that will prioritize advances in attaining space-based sensors and defending against
hypersonic threats.
Congressional input relating to the trajectory American nuclear policy should take is an
important guidepost for any effort the administration might make in asking for increased funding
of missile defense. Democrats in Congress have lobbied the administration to discontinue
modernization efforts, exemplified in a letter twenty two lawmakers, including the co-chairs of
the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, which urged President Biden
to “reject a 21st Century arms race” and to “make bold decisions to lead us towards a future
where nuclear weapons no longer threaten all humanity.”37 The Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee Adam Smith (D-W.A.) also called on Biden “to take a hard look at whether
every ongoing and planned [modernization] effort is necessary.”38 Republicans have asked the
administration to continue the current trajectory of modernization, citing Russia and China’s
nuclear developments.39 However, missile defense is supported by Republicans, with its
inception being the articulated by President Reagan.40 Additionally, President Trump’s MDR in
2019 advocated a significant expansion of the role and scope of U.S. missile defenses, stating the
goal is to, “ensure we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States—
anywhere, anytime, anyplace.”41 The new administration should continue this expanded view
missile defense, focusing the MDR on such advanced space capabilities as the Hypersonic and

37

Id. See also Reif, supra note 19.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Kingston Reif, Congress Rewrites Missile Defense Policy, ARMSCONTROLASSOCIATION, (January/February
2017), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-01/news/congress-rewrites-missile-defense-policy (noting the 2017
NDAA broading missile defense was sponsored in the House of Representatives and the Senate by Republicans).
41
Id.
38
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Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, accelerating the Glide phase interceptor, and the more
affordable directed energy technology to clearly prioritize its funding goals to Congress.42
The MDR will be completed at a time when China is only beginning a substantial nuclear
buildup, warranting a detailed examination.
C. Preempting the PRC’s Nuclear Buildup
While the Biden administration has made some nuclear arms progress with Russia,
immediately extending the New START treaty43 until 2026 and reiterating along with President
Putin, the Reagan-Gorbachev principle that “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be
fought” at the Geneva summit in June44, China remains unmoored by any nuclear arms control
agreements limiting arsenal size.45 As the administration hopefully seeks to move away from the
dangerous trend of letting crucial nuclear control treaties such as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) to be discarded46, missile defense remains the best facilitator of restoring
responsibility among sovereign nations to eventually reduce nuclear weapons. In the alternative,
if China continues to refuse cooperating in arms control talks, which Biden’s own top

42

See Patty-Jane Geller, How the Upcoming Missile Defense Review Can Make America Safer, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, (October 4, 2021), https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/how-the-upcoming-missile-defensereview-can-make-america-safer. (Noting the FY 2022 budget includes $256 million for the HBTSS sensor). See also
MDA and the 2022 Budget, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, (June 22, 2021),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/mda-and-2022-budget, (Noting the Director of MDA stated, “we need space
capability” and referenced the proposals above prioritized in the 2022 budget to counter the threat of hypersonic
weapons).
43
See Why It Matters: Nuclear Security, supra note 9. Even a positive development in nuclear reductions, such as
the renewal of the New Start agreement with Russia until 2026, merely continues a dangerous stability in the status
quo, limiting both countries to a staggering 1,550 deployed operational warheads.
44
Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin Summit, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (last updated
September 30, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11694.
45
Rose Gottemoeller, Lessons from the Cold War on Preventing a U.S.-China Arms Race, POLITICO MAGAZINE.
(November 23, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/11/23/biden-xi-cold-war-nuclear-arms-race523248. See also 2021 Report on China’s Military Developments, infra, note 48 at 93 (Raising concern China might
not be adhering to the “zero yield” standard under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).
46
See Murray, supra note 10.
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intelligence officials, in its annual threat assessment, specifically cited as Beijing’s position47,
missile defense sends a clear signal of our resolve.
China’s buildup is deeply concerning. A new annual report from the Department of
Defense (DOD) assessing Chinese military developments described the accelerating pace of the
PRC’s nuclear program as a “major expansion,” estimating they may have up to 700 warheads
by 2027, and at least 1,000 by 2030.48 These revised estimates exceeded even the U.S.’s
projections from just one year ago.49 The PRC also likely now has a full nuclear triad, gaining
air-launched missile capability while improving its ground and sea based nuclear weapons.50
This revised analysis, along with the 250 nuclear silo expansions, precipitated the report to
predict China to increase peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces, moving to a launch-onwarning posture.51 The buildup is being supplemented with large increases in plutonium reactors
and increased activity at its largest nuclear site.52 Accompanying this unnerving increase is a
troubling assessment anticipating future outpacing of any adversary’s nuclear capability that
could threaten Beijing’s ability to retaliate against a first strike.53

47

Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supra note 4. (The report stated that, “Beijing is
not interested in arms-control agreements that restrict its modernization plans and will not agree to substantive
negotiations that lock in U.S. or Russian nuclear advantage").
48
See, Military and Security Developments Involving The People’s Republic of China 2021, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, (November 3, 2021), 90, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPRFINAL.PDF.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 93, 94. (Where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 92.
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As this paper is written, reports of China constructing 250 new ICBM silos54, testing a
hypersonic missile in August55, and a definitive increased belligerence towards Taiwan56 all
bolster the need to staunch Chinese nuclear advancements with defensive technology. These
recent events were described by Admiral Charles Richard, the head of Strategic Command, as “a
strategic breakout by China” adding, “the explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and
conventional forces can only be described as breathtaking.”57
Military spending further supports its buildup. China’s defense budget for 2021 was a 6.8
percent increase from the previous year58, totaling $209 billion, making the PRC the second
largest military budget in the world and reflecting its nuclear advances.59 Spending on the
Chinese military as a total of government spending rose to 5.4 percent, and “for the past decade,
the annual increase in China’s official military spending has outpaced its annual GDP growth,
reflecting the priority that Beijing attaches to bolstering its armed forces.”60
The Biden administration’s focus on China’s nuclear capabilities must be paramount in
its overall strategy in countering Beijing. There can be no doubt of China’s mission to principally
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threaten the U.S.61 The annual threat assessment, published in April 2021 and supplemented by
top intelligence officials testifying before Congress, leaves no doubt of China’s alarming nuclear
actions, stating that China’s ballistic missile arsenal is “more survivable, more diverse, and on
higher alert than in the past, including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional
escalation and ensure an intercontinental second-strike capability.”62
While the administration stated after China’s reported hypersonic missile test it
“welcomes stiff competition,”63 it must not forget the strategic aspect to the competition, and
there is no beneficial strategy in failing to confront Beijing on these aggressive actions. China’s
increasing nuclear capabilities, along with the destabilizing nuclear threat posed by DPRK, only
further complicates the already complex foreign policy of the Asia-Pacific region.
China’s nuclear arsenal is currently estimated at 290-350 weapons.64 Those, including
Beijing, who repeatedly point out China’s arsenal is only one-tenth the size of the U.S.’s,
therefore, concern is unwarranted, leads to a false sense of security. China’s arsenal disparity to
the U.S.’s is not a reason for complacency. History has not looked favorably on previous
examples of complacency in the face of military build-ups, epitomized by John F. Kennedy's
thesis, "Why England Slept."65 Let there be no illusions, the Chinese arsenal will not remain
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there for long, as consensus among military officials at the Pentagon and independent policy
analysts have concluded the PRC’s ambitions are expanding as detailed above. The Biden
administration and policymakers need only take note of a lesson from the Cold War and the first
arms race, when the U.S. built over 32,000 warheads and the U.S.S.R. over 40,000, to avoid a
second arms race. Parity is not the answer to peace.
Any delay in a robust development of space-based interceptors and an increase in the
U.S. land, air, and sea-based defense systems only invites further development of offensive
capabilities. Against this daunting backdrop, preliminary plans for the U.S. to modernize its
nuclear arsenal and missile defense funding projections for the next decade render a clear
outcome, missile defense has been underfunded.
D. Cost of Nuclear Arsenal Modernization and Missile Defenses for the Next Decade
The United States is planning to upgrade and modernize its nuclear arsenal over the next
decade. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects spending until fiscal year 2030 at an
estimated $634 billion.66 The new nuclear spending assessment is 28 percent higher than the
CBO’s previous estimates from just two years ago, which totaled $494 billion over the 20192028 period.67 This budget allocation would average just over $60 billion per year, with twothirds of the costs incurred by the DOD for ballistic missile submarines and intercontinental
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ballistic missiles.68 Importantly, these estimates do not account for any change in plans as
submitted by DOD, additional cost growth or schedule delays.69
To put the current nuclear budget in perspective, the U.S. spent $714 billion on defense in
2020, is expected to spend $733 billion in 2021, and the administration is expected to ask for 753
billion for fiscal year 2022.70
Comparing what the U.S. spends on nuclear weapons ($634 billion) to what the U.S.
currently spends on missile defense, the Biden administration’s FY 2022 budget request asks for
$20.4 billion.71 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)72 highest ever budget allocation adjusted
for inflation was $11.5 billion in fiscal year 2018.73 The MDA’s FY 2021 budget request was
$9.13 billion.74 The FY 2022 budget request is $8.917 billion, an eighteen percent decrease from
FY 2021 and actually a net decrease in real dollars from FY 2008.75
To further demonstrate the more cost-effective pursuit of missile defense capabilities, the
CBO projected U.S. spending on future missile defenses for fiscal years 2020-2029 based on the
2019 Missile Defense Review.76 The estimate of the DOD’s 10-year costs of missile defense as
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described in their 2020 budget request would be about $176 billion.77 The estimated cost is about
$50 billion higher than the CBO’s last projection from 2017-2026.78 The overall cost of the NGI
system will be about $18 billion over ten years.79 According to the FY 2021 budget request it
will be one-quarter of one percent of DOD’s budget through FY 2026.80 If you combine NGI and
GMD funding, it will account for one-half of one percent of the DOD budget within the same
period.81
To further emphasize the lesser burden of funding missile defense, additional context is
needed in answering critics who contend funding missile defense is wasteful. Opponents cite the
MDA receiving $152 billion from its creation in 2002 to 2018, and an anticipated $47 billion
from FY 2019 to 2023, totaling $199 billion.82 This amount while not minimal, is only one third
of the anticipated cost of nuclear modernization, reduced further when compared to domestic
investments in the trillions. Central to any discussion of cost regarding missile defense is asking
what is more important than investing in the defense of our nation? Investment in missile defense
can and should be increased as technology develops and threats from adversaries dictate a need
for adequate funding.
Part II: History and Principles of Missile Defense
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A brief history detailing the U.S. pursuit of missile defense before and after SDI is
helpful, providing a relevant framework prior to a discussion of the SDI initiative and three
principles that still inform missile defense today.
A. U.S. Pursuit of Missile Defense Before and After SDI
The United States has pursued a viable missile defense capability long before SDI, since
the 1950’s.83 In March of 1969 President Nixon announced that at his direction, the Pentagon
begin developing a system to protect land based retaliatory forces from Soviet attack, defend the
American people from a nuclear attack from China, which he predicted would be attainable in a
decade, and to protect against accidental launches.84 DOD developed the “Safeguard” system at
Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota to protect the base’s 150 nuclear missiles.85
Advocates of the precursor missile defense system argued it would been improved over time,
however, Congress stopped its funding by 1976.86
Moving forward past SDI87, the idea of utilizing lasers in space to destroy nuclear
missiles was renamed “Brilliant Pebbles” transitioning from land based missiles to space-based
missiles.88 However, this was unsuccessful and President Clinton deprioritized missile defense,
even vetoing legislation that would have mandated deployment of a limited national missile
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defense (NMD) under the belief no threat justified deploying such a system.89 The no threat
assumption was quickly challenged when North Korea launched a missile over Japan, creating a
new urgency in NMD and prompting President Clinton to ask for a substantial increase in
funding.90 A large bipartisan majority passed the NMD Act of 1999, Clinton had no choice but to
sign or be overridden by veto.91
B. President Reagan Addresses the Nation
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, in an Oval Office address to the nation, outlined a
drastic shift in nuclear deterrence, upending the decades old mutually assured destruction (MAD)
policy for an idea that gambled on the hope of attainable technologies at the start of the next
century. As President Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative, he laid out several
important, then and now foundational principles, worth revisiting which still inform missile
defense and provide a critical framework for supporting missile defense policies today.
a. Deterrence.
SDI and the missile defense capabilities existing today should be viewed in the context of
deterrence, a theme the Biden administration should rely on in persuading Congress. President
Reagan’s ability to communicate succinctly and eloquently did just that, stating what deterrence
is, “making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our
vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains.”92 The central
premise of missile defense is about deterring our adversaries to attack us because they would be
unsure of the result of an initial first strike. Our current capabilities leave no such doubt,
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rendering us reliant on what President Reagan called “deterrence of aggression through the
promise of retaliation.”93
President Reagan’s speech affirmed a fundamental aspect of missile defense reiterated by
President Biden in his U.N. speech, the U.S. “will never be an aggressor. We maintain our
strength in order to deter and defend against aggression to preserve freedom and peace.”94
Missile defense is not a threat to other countries, rather the U.S.’s goal in advancing defensive
mechanisms is to defend its people.
b. Preparedness.
The address accounted for an audience of citizens that had lived through, suffered, and
served through two World Wars, and reminded them, as it should remind us, that “we didn’t start
them” and “did everything we could to avoid being drawn into them. But we were ill-prepared
for both.” We would serve our interests to remember the horrors of massive conflict as those
world wars demonstrated, and always remember a chilling realization, that today such a
comparable conflict would involve nuclear weapons. Reagan’s words again remain prescient
when he said, “Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military
power?” answering with a question as true today if you replace the PRC for Soviets, “can we
afford to believe they won’t.”95 Every U.S. administration’s primary obligation is to protect the
American people by being prepared. Decades ago, SDI sought to prepare for and prevent Soviet
nuclear aggression, today such preparedness demands the same attempt to attain space defense to
counter Chinese aggression.
c. Challenging the Norm.
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Reagan’s speech acknowledged the national security threats, particularly nuclear threats
facing the U.S., as well as the unsatisfactory answer provided by predecessors of the presidency,
offensive retaliation.96 Reagan’s discontentment with this strategy led him to find an alternative,
resting on the conviction that, “the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with
other nations and human beings by threatening their existence.”97 The President acknowledged
another fundamental truth in arms control then and now, that even if adversaries agree to major
arms reductions, we are tethered to retaliation and mutual threat.98 After underscoring such a
reality “a sad commentary on the human condition” the President of the United States dared to
ask, “Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of
demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving
a truly lasting stability?”99 This question led to another, one that would fundamentally change the
dynamics of nuclear power:
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest
upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept
and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our
allies?100
President Reagan’s optimism offered a vision of hope for the future, utilizing the American “can
do” spirit by “turn[ing] to the very strengths in technology that…ha[s] given us the quality of life
we enjoy today,” calling upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons “to turn
their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of
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rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”101 (emphasis added). After daring the
nation to such a task, implausible as it was, Reagan acknowledged that the task remained a
formidable one, and advised it would be a decades long effort, riddled with risks, failures and
setbacks, but he contextualized the seemingly insurmountable goal with another question, “Isn’t
it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?”102 As the
address concluded, it stated the effort being launched “holds the promise of changing the course
of human history” and expressed a firm belief that we as Americans can do it.103
Reviewing the speech is refreshing in a world that has receded from emphasis on defense
and shifted back to offensive retaliation, spending billions on weapons rather than missile
defense. President Biden has the opportunity to challenge the norm as President Reagan did,
utilizing American spirit to mobilize and implement a fundamental change in the nuclear status
quo. The administration should articulate these principles when declaring to our allies and
adversaries alike, President Biden’s core statement, “America is back” as the leader in restoring a
nuclear world order.
Part III: A Relic of the Past Transferable to Today
An overview of our current missile defense systems is examined as a necessary predicate
to provide context. This section will show continued improvement in current abilities, before
demonstrating the now attainable pursuit of space-based missile defense. Next, two previous
historical examples of U.S. Presidents refusing to trade away the future potential of achieving an
SDI-type program for short term nuclear reductions, offers insight into why no such trade should
be made today. Accompanying this subpart is an overview of common missile defense myths,
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followed by a discussion of how the administration, through persuading Congress for increased
funding, can implement defenses in the realm of space. After domestic action is outlined, some
lessons from the Cold War are offered to guide negotiations with Beijing. Lastly, additional
policy recommendations supplementing missile defense are given.
A. Reviewing Our Current Missile Defense Capabilities
A brief overview of current U.S. missile defense capabilities is required to demonstrate
the feasibility of improvement in existing technology as well as implementing space-based
interceptors. At this moment U.S. missile defense cannot counter a large-scale nuclear attack, the
original achievement sought by pursuing SDI.104
The U.S. homeland missile defense system, known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight.105 The GMD
relies on “hit-to-kill” technology; the kill vehicle seeks out the incoming missile in space and
destroys it through collision.106 There are currently forty-four GMD interceptors deployed; forty
at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.107 The Pentagon is
building a new missile field at Fort Greely, intending to add twenty interceptors by 2023.108 The
GMD relies on an extensive and complex network of ground and space based sensors and radars,
but these are vulnerable to interception.109 Enhancing the sensors and radar system to make it
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more impervious is a critical component in an increased reliance on missile defense, especially in
protecting the U.S.110
Accompanying any discussion of missile defense is success rate. The GMD system’s
tests record is not without room for improvement. Half of the forty-four interceptors currently
deployed are fitted with the (CE)-I kill vehicle which succeeded in two of four tests, while one
third of the interceptors are fitted with the CE-II kill vehicle which has a fifty percent success
rate.111 More recent tests have substantially improved the GMD, with a successful test in
September of 2021 of a new three stage booster designed to enhance the GMD interceptors,
building on a successful 2019 test which fired two interceptors from Vandenberg Air Force Base
in California at an ICBM launched 4,000 miles away.112
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is a portable missile defense
capability and the only U.S. missile defense system designed to intercept short, medium, and
intermediate range targets during the terminal phase.113 THAAD like GMD utilizes hit-to-kill
technology, with each battery consisting forty eight interceptors.114 THAAD’s test rate was
initially poor, only successfully performing in two out of eight tests, but THAAD now has a
110
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perfect test record of sixteen consecutive intercepts, including an ICBM target as recent as
2019.115 The U.S. owns seven of these flexible THAAD batteries, some are deployed long term
in Guam and South Korea, while its suitability for rapid and temporary deployments was
demonstrated by the U.S. European Central Command in sending a THAAD battery to Israel and
another to Romania in 2019.116 THAAD protects our allies and deters our adversaries near their
own borders; in the case of South Korea, provoking a negative response from China which
serves as an example of how effective missile defense hits a nerve.117 The success of THAAD
has also resulted in other countries seeking to purchase the system.118
The Aegis missile defense system, which is capable of being deployed both on land as an
“Aegis Ashore” or at sea on certain cruisers and destroyers, intercepts short, medium, and
intermediate range missiles during the midcourse and terminal phases of flight.119 The navy
currently has forty eight Aegis operational ships, with additional ships to be operational by
2023.120 The Aegis system’s primary interceptor, the SM-2 Block IV also has a perfect test
record with the most recent test being conducted in 2015.121 While the Aegis system overall has
a record of thirty four successful tests out of forty three attempts, an effective test of the SM-3
Block IIA at the end of 2020 against an ICBM-representative target was successful.122 After the
successful MDA test, the Pentagon plans to procure fifty SM-3 Block IIA interceptors per year
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beginning in 2024.123 The CBO projects unit cost at $30 million, much more affordable than the
NGI ground based interceptors.124 The administration should continue such plans, providing a
critical component to shifting missile defense towards larger threats and demonstrates the ever
decreasing cost of missile defense.
Missile defense is no longer an unrealistic scheme of President Reagan. The U.S. is
reliant on our current capabilities to defend against an attack from rogue states such as North
Korea, evidenced by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s testimony before Congress characterizing
missile defense as “a central component to keeping the homeland safe.”125 The increased success
of GMD should encourage the new administration to examine the viability of developing spacebased interceptors, drones, and other advances in missile defense to counter China.
B. SDI: A Relic of the Past Transferable to Today
In an era of sending ordinary Americans into space due to the hobbies of billionaires,
among other previously unthinkable technological developments, implementing defensive
mechanisms in space to intercept missiles is not nearly as incredulous today as it was decades
ago.
Unlike past attempts at space-based laser interceptors, the technology, is now more than
ever attainable using drones, potential development of an interceptor in space, and directed
energy technology.126 The U.S. Air Force successfully tested a laser system to shoot down
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missiles in 2019.127 The U.S.’s unmanned aerial vehicle directed-energy missile defense program
(UAV DMDP) presents the first opportunity to destroy nuclear missiles in the critical boost
phase when the missile is compact, can be easily tracked, and neutralizes countermeasures as
well as multiple warheads.128 This program seeks to utilize the high-altitude, endurance, cost
effective benefits of drones that would realize SDI’s original goal. For this to be accomplished
the drones must be able to fly 63,000 feet high, be in flight for more than thirty-six hours without
refueling, have a cruising speed of 350mph and be able to support laser weaponry weighing up to
12,500 pounds.129 Before skeptics give in to pessimism, these drones are set to be operational as
early as 2023, prompting a senior fellow for laser and systems at Lockheed Martin to state,
“[w]e’re really at the dawn of an era of the utility of laser weapons.”130 Such a breakthrough led
one scholar to assert this “would provide a sense of national security and peace of mind that the
United States has not felt since before the Cold War.”131
Additionally, the placement of critical sensors to track missiles and guide interception in
space has “some of the greatest benefits of sensor elevation.”132 The creation of the Space Force
and SDA gives the DOD more ability to deploy space-based sensors, with the (SBIRS) satellites
and (OPIR) sensors for initial missile warnings passing a crucial design review in August 2021,
prompting the Pentagon to begin an effort to launch 500 satellites that would provide improved
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means of tracking ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.133 The MDA and SDA are also
collaborating to deploy lower orbit tracking sensors for both hypersonic and ballistic missiles,
allowing continuous tracking of missiles.134
Despite the feasibility of space-based missile defense, many have in the past and are at
present urging trading away potential advancements in missile defense, but history reminds us of
the near sightedness of such a bad bargain.
C. Revisiting Reykjavik: Lessons for Today
The administration in their well-intentioned goal of limiting proliferation and nuclear
weapons, might be tempted, persuaded, or pressured by adversaries such as Russia and China or
arms control advocates135 to put missile defense “on the table,” relinquishing or severely limiting
missile defense research, development, and deployment, in exchange for substantial reductions
or even eliminations in nuclear arsenals. The trade might seem enticing, but the President, the
Secretary of State, and all within the administration must answer unequivocally, NO.
This would not be the first time a president confronted hostility in pursuing the uncertain
long-term gamble of missile defense rather than a short-term opportunity to reduce nuclear
stockpiles. In the fall of 1986 Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland for a summit to
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negotiate reductions in nuclear weapons.136 Gorbachev had one goal at Reykjavik, to talk his
counterpart out of pursuing SDI.137 The Soviet leader sought to achieve this by making an offer
seemingly irrefusable, the U.S.S.R. would agree to massive cuts if not complete elimination of
their nuclear weapons if the U.S. agreed in exchange to limit SDI to research only.138 President
Reagan refused to relinquish the potential of SDI.139
The summit and the decision by President Reagan were derided in the press, with the
Washington Post headline, “Nonexistent Weapons Undid Summit.”140 With the President not
folding, Gorbachev would have to compete with our abilities, forcing an already stretched Soviet
economy to expand its huge military spending even further.141 Despite facing severe criticism the
decision, even from staunch allies such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who throughout the
Reagan administration, sided with critics of SDI, had a rare reversal of opinion, writing in her
memoir that SDI “was to prove central to the West’s victory in the Cold War.”142 The iconic
prime minister concluded her assessment of pursuing SDI, stating, “Looking back, it is now clear
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to me that Ronald Reagan’s original decision on SDI was the single most important of his
presidency.”143
The second time an American President was faced with pressure to relinquish pursuit of
missile defense was decades after the famous Iceland summit. The Soviets contended that the
Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty was in direct conflict, legally and logically with deploying
missile defense systems.144 Entire scholarly works were dedicated to the subject145, but the
vociferous debate ended when President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. as a signatory in
2002.146 Yet again an American President chose the potential of missile defense rather than
adhering to a treaty predicated on the unavailability of technology from a moment in time thirty
years ago.147 Under President Bush the Missile Defense Agency was established and the GMD
system deployed, laying the groundwork for much of the viable missile defense we rely on
today.148 This only further underscores why missile defense is so important, and should never be
traded away.
Returning to Reykjavik, President Reagan, after denying Gorbachev’s remarkable
concessions, looking for reassurance, wrote on a note to Secretary of State George Schultz, “Am
I wrong?” Schultz whispered back, “No. You are right.”149 President Biden should have the same
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conviction if confronted with a third attempt by our adversaries or skeptics at home to stop
additional advances because trading away missile defense relies on the failed policies of the past
rather than the technological possibilities of the future.
Undoubtedly fueling calls to trade away missile defense are several misperceptions that
the administration will be confronted with if an expansion of missile defense is pursued.
D. Missile Defense Myths
The President and his new administration in conducting the MDR to alter the status quo,
formulating a modern space-based missile defense policy, and in lobbying Congress for adequate
funding, should be mindful of and reject several myths surrounding missile defense.
a. Missile Defense Disrupts Strategic Stability
The argument that missile defense alters the strategic balance of the major nuclear powers
given the current capabilities of the U.S., lacks merit. The forty-four interceptors within the U.S.,
even with the additional twenty planned to be deployed could not possibly threaten Russia’s
1,550 warheads, nor China’s increasing arsenal.150 The GMD system was and still is predicated
on countering a rogue regime such as the DPRK or thwarting an attack from Iran. Additionally,
these same critics quickly discrediting our current capabilities with a 50 percent success rate, are
left to answer how such an ineffective system alters strategic stability? A change in the strategic
stability would require hundreds of ground-based interceptors which the U.S. at present and the
foreseeable future is not acquiring.151 The argument has some merit when considering the
potential for space-based satellites and interceptors given the technological advances described
above, however, even the Soviet Union when it sought to limit SDI in the 1980s, the proposal
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still allowed for research, which this paper recommends. If the technology proves feasible in
testing, then addressing the imbalance it might create will need to be addressed, not before.
Moreover, Russia and China have their own advanced missile defense systems despite
ironically protesting the U.S. system.152 Russia possess sixty-eight nuclear armed interceptors
near Moscow, more than the U.S. possesses, not to mention both countries’ advanced air
defenses that can intercept our ballistic missiles.153 The PRC is also working on land and sea
mid-course missile defense capabilities and testing an interceptor that may be able to thwart
ICBM’s.154 If we use the illogical reasoning of Moscow and Beijing, since U.S. missile defense
disrupts their retaliatory capabilities, their own missile defense systems would be just as
destabilizing, if not more.
b. Missile Defense Will Provoke Our Adversaries to Buildup Their Arsenals155
An examination of the past few decades shows no causal connection between increased
missile defense capabilities and a clear buildup in response. In fact, Russia and China pursue
offensive nuclear weapons regardless of U.S. missile defense efforts. After the U.S. agreed to the
ABM Treaty in 1972, dismantling its Safeguard system (discussed above), and refraining from
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building any missile defense systems, the Soviet Union proceeded to engage in one of the largest
nuclear buildups in its history, tripling the number of deployed warheads over the next decade.156
Even the often cited hypersonic weapons Russia and China boast of, which on their face
seem to respond directly to missile defense, due to their low flight altitude evading detection, but
alternate theories, such as giving an adversary less warning with standard radar capabilities
render it more desirable inapposite any missile defense.157 Moreover, China gain little if any
security advantage in developing such defense immune weapons because every Yuan spent on
these “show-off value” systems is not invested in other military projects that could threaten other
weaknesses of the U.S.158 Such development of advanced weapons telegraphs a concern that the
U.S. will develop a more robust missile defense capability, even before any serious efforts by the
U.S. are underway, much less being implemented.
China’s nuclear buildup cannot be said to be caused by U.S. missile defense enhancements
either. A full two years before the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and before
implementing the limit GMD system in 2004, U.S. intelligence officials were predicting a
significant expansion in Chinese intercontinental nuclear weapons.159 The PRC’s gradual nuclear
buildup over the last two decades can instead be largely explained by Russian nuclear
modernization on China’s border, increased focus on its national strategic interests and regional
ambitions, and perhaps most likely, wanting to demonstrate its great power status.160 The
analysis renders the conclusion that if the U.S. refrained and continues to refrain from
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improvement of missile defense China would not have altered its strategy.161 As a former
defense secretary once said, “When we build, they build; when we cut, they build” the same
remains true today, regardless of U.S. action, if an adversary is motivated to buildup a nuclear
arsenal they will do so, without incentive otherwise.162
Additionally, fears of provoking a buildup are misplaced. The buildup is already occurring,
and it can hardly be asserted that such a drastic action was the result of THAAD batteries on
South Korea, the only missile defense action taken by the U.S. in recent years.163 The impulse
follow up argument, that further pursuing missile defense will only increase China’s buildup also
fails to persuade. With the prediction China will amass 1,000 warheads by 2030, any further
increase becomes surplus. Moreover, would it not be better to mitigate a sizeable buildup with
defense rather than remain defenseless against a smaller one which still would have devastating
consequences. The U.S. would in fact, in pursuing space defenses, be catching up to a threat
posed by our adversaries.164
In considering the alleged provocation missile defense causes, one should ask if the U.S. had
remained a signatory to the ABM treaty (with Moscow’s defense system in place) would Russia
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have not built these weapons?165 The same question to be asked regarding China, if the U.S. had
no missile defenses would the PRC not be pursuing a buildup?
c. Missile Defense is Prohibitively Expensive and Provides Minimal Deterrence
Opponents of missile defense often assert that because missile defense fails to be one
hundred percent effective, it therefore, cannot and should not be relied on.166 Critics cite
“scripted” tests, the no room for failure reality of the system during a conflict, and continually
advancing countermeasures, all render it not feasible to implement.167 Skeptics in shooting down
missile defense, state that even a high success rate of ninety percent or higher would still kill
thousands, depending on how many missiles get through.168 However, critics omit the fact that
this sets an unrealistic standard never intended by advocates of strategic defense, going back to
when SDI was originally proposed and debated.169 Since its inception during the Reagan
administration, space-based missile defense aimed to create:
A new defense dominant strategic environment in which offensive nuclear
arms would gradually lose their primary military utility relative to defensive
ones. Most strategic defense proponents neither expect nor even strive for a
system that will provide perfect defenses. By making it difficult for a
potential aggressor to predict his own vulnerability in the face of
uncertainties about the success of his aggression, strategic defense can create
an effective deterrent posture based not on the threat of offensive retaliation
but rather on the defensive denial of military objectives.170
SDI and its modern counterpart was not meant to be, nor would it be today, exclusively
defensive.171 Moreover, an adversary’s desire to overcome defensive measures, the hypersonic
capabilities of today, were anticipated by the likelihood of “stealth” long range cruise missiles or
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“advanced ICBMs equipped with strategic defense countermeasures.”172 Their ability to puncture
“will not obviate the overall deterrent capability of a strategic defense system capable of keeping
out most offensive weapons. Rather, it will complicate an enemy's plans for a first strike and
caution him against aggression.”173 Reiterating the change missile defense would have in the
nuclear status quo, “the hope is that a defense dominant system in conjunction with offensive
arms reductions will gradually diminish the military utility of offensive nuclear weapons and
thus shift investment of military resources from offensive to defensive forces.”174
Besides the previous discussion, the minimal amount the U.S. spends on missile defense and
that in fact the U.S. has not spent enough, two other points regarding cost need to be addressed.
First, although critics consistently cite the amount the U.S. has previously spent on missile
defense, it fails to acknowledge the majority of that money has been spent when technology
prohibited development and came at a much higher cost.175 Second, anti-missile defense voices
must answer a question once aptly posed by a former Congressman who asked, “How much is
Chicago worth? How much is Cincinnati worth? Is Philadelphia worth 100 million or 500
million?”176
With the primary myths of missile defense dispelled, the administration is now armed with
sufficient information to make the argument to Congress. This action will require use of existing
structures such as appropriations bills, and an executive order to enable Congressional buy in.
Part IV: Next Steps for the Administration: Implementing and Negotiating
A. Persuading Congress
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The Biden administration has a number of weapons in its arsenal when endeavoring to
persuade Congress for an increase in funding missile defense. Moreover, the domestic legal
mechanisms are already established in renewing commitment to missile defense.
The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) statutorily proscribed a “robust
layered missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the [U.S.] and its allies
against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat.”177 The 2017 NDAA
broadened the Missile Defense Act of 1999, which stated the goal of the United States to “deploy
as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.”178 With law
endorsing missile defense already in place, the President should use future appropriations bills as
the legal mechanism to implement space-based missile defense.
In order to facilitate Congressional support for greater emphasis on missile defense, the
President should sign an executive order clearly delineating MDA’s responsibilities to include
missile defense research and development, given increased Congressional concern over the lack
of experience in tasking the newly designated Space Development Agency (SDA) with such
functions.179 Resolving a bureaucratic budgetary battle over whether the SDA or MDA should
develop space-based sensors would assuage Congress and assure confidence in future funding.
Additionally, unlike almost every other subject in Washington, missile defense has
enjoyed broad support across the political spectrum and received support for funding regardless
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of which party controls Congress.180 The administration should, in garnering additional missile
defense funding, craft a compromise, capitalizing on Democrats negative view of nuclear
modernization and Republicans who advocate for an expansion of missile defense. Clear signals
to Beijing that present and future administrations enjoy unwavering domestic support for missile
defense, strengthens the U.S. position at the nuclear negotiating table.
B. Negotiating from A Position of Strength: How Cold War Arms Control Offers a
Blueprint for Beijing
A helpful analogy can be drawn between the impact SDI had in spurring the Soviet Union to
the negotiating table and the probability that a modern pursuit of space-based missile defense
(SMD), due to the presence of similar factors, would also have the same effect with China.
While claims that SDI singularly resulted in the collapse of the U.S.S.R. is not a valid
conclusion, it was a crucial secondary factor prompting a resumption of negotiations.181
Gorbachev was willing to negotiate in part because of a desire to focus on domestic concerns
rather than further draining economic resources to compete with it.182 President Xi is facing a
similar preference to work on domestic and economic concerns.183 SMD will additionally burden
the Chinese economy, even if by prompting the PRC to invest in “show value weapons” as
discussed previously or raise enough doubt about success of an attack. SMD like SDI should not
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be the sole factor, but rather one tool of many in dealing with Beijing.184 Again, missile defense
did not by itself bring the Soviets to the table, nor will it today, but it fits, as it did in the Reagan
era, in the comprehensive approach the Biden administration has in engaging with Beijing. SDI
was predicated on a long-term plan to pressure the Soviets to negotiate, using the leverage of
U.S. advantages in technology, economic might, and morality.185 These U.S. advantages remain
at the disposal of President Biden today. This historical precedent importantly informs current
negotiations.
Although U.S.-China tensions are high, with relations between the world’s two largest
economies strained186, and the inception of a new arms race seemingly inevitable, facilitating
talks between Washington and Beijing is nevertheless doable. While Chinese officials have
consistently demurred on entering arms control talks187, there is reason for optimism. The
President and President Xi Jinping had a high stakes virtual summit lasting over three hours on
November 15, 2021.188 President Biden raised the possibility of “strategic stability talks,” to
which President Xi agreed according to administration officials, a precursor to substantive arms
control talks, which the National Security Advisor (NSC) explicitly stated were not the focus.189
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The situation is reminiscent of talks undertaken with Russia at the beginning of the last arms
race, one difference being the benefit of lessons learned.190
An analogy to past nuclear negotiations with Russia is helpful here, giving current
policymakers a framework from the first arms race to use in preventing a second one with China.
Two major lessons from our experience with Russia should be adhered to with China. First, the
U.S. and China should avoid trying to limit new technologies and focus on ensuring mutual
nuclear predictability, knowing such efforts failed during the Cold War.191 Second, be prepared
for a long, complex process, since it took the U.S. and U.S.S.R. a decade to agree to control
measures such as verification, and until 1986 to seriously consider reductions.192
These two lessons once again show the need for pursuing missile defense. With no limits
on technology off the table, the U.S. could pursue space-based missile defense, so could the PRC
if they perceive success. What the U.S. does not want repeated from its Cold War experience, is
pursuing missile defense at the end of the decade or even later, when valuable time in research
and development, as well as any potential to curb China’s growing arsenal, is lost. Additionally,
the reality of a long, tough road ahead signals a need to prepare for the possibility that talks with
Beijing amount to just talking.193 Missile defense provides insurance (just like SDI) in the event
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China like the Soviet Union, continues to buildup. Even if the PRC shows a willingness to
meaningful discussions, missile defense gives Washington increased leverage.
The Biden administration should also learn a more recent lesson and not push for a
multilateral meeting of the new big three since our nuclear discussions with Russia are more
advanced, they should be focused on a treaty to succeed New START, while nascent
negotiations with Beijing should clarify the PRC’s nuclear intentions, beginning with broad steps
such as seeking Beijing to reaffirm the Reagan-Gorbachev principle and recommitting to Article
VI of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.194 Engaging in common interest areas where China
possesses comparable capabilities, such as space and technology, would be more productive,
allowing both countries to set protective measures on action in space without trying to limit
technologies like missile defense or Chinese advances. A targeted approach such as this learns
the first lesson recommended, while still endeavoring to find common ground and allows the
U.S. to pursue missile defense.
C. Policy Recommendations
The Biden administration in addition to persuading Congress to support space-based
missile defense over the next decade, several other recommendations should be considered and
prioritized to maximize short term benefits of our current capabilities and further strengthen its
position with Beijing. These are not extensively detailed and could be the subject of future work,
including: (1) The administration should expand our GMD interceptors to 100 at a minimum; (2)
Create an additional GMD site within the U.S.; (3) Prioritize implementation of the NGI
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interceptor; (4) Build an Aegis ashore system in Guam to increase security of the U.S. territory
from North Korea and China.195
CONCLUSION
One of President Biden’s most admired presidents is Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whom
he honors with a large portrait in the Oval Office.196 FDR’s philosophy in confronting the Great
Depression was, “to take a method and try it: if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But
above all, try something.”197 This approach shares commonality here, the United States has tried
the mutually assured destruction (MAD) policy and it has failed, efforts at containing
proliferation in the past few decades have failed, our policymakers should admit this and try
another: missile defense, which has worked to a certain extent and is more possible today than
ever given technological advances.
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